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ABSTRACT. International negotiations for an agreement to reduce the emission of
greenhouse gases have not produced cost-effective policies for reducing emissions, not
least because they are unlikely to prevent ‘leakage’ through a re-location of carbon-
intensive activities to poorer countries. An alternative or supplementary approach that
is more likely to achieve at least some emission reductions, and at the same time generate
national and global economic benefits rather than costs, involves lowering coal subsidies
and trade barriers. Past coal policies have encouraged excessive production of coal in a
number of industrial countries and excessive coal consumption in numerous developing
and transition economies. This paper documents those distortions and outlines the cir-
cumstances under which their reform (currently under way in some countries) could
both improve the economy and lower greenhouse gas emissions globally. It then quan-
tifies the effects on economic activity as well as global carbon emissions, using the
G-Cubed multi-country general equilibrium model of the world economy. Both the gains
in economic efficiency and the reductions in carbon dioxide emissions that could result
from such reforms are found to be substantial—a ‘no regrets’ outcome or win–win Pareto
improvement for the economy and the environment.
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1. Introduction
With respect to the environment, governments are often blamed for not
doing enough, such as taxing polluters. Their reticence is understandable
from a political viewpoint: the interventions advocated by environmental
groups are typically harmful to the economic interests of powerful
industry groups. Yet there are many situations where it would be more
appropriate for environmentalists to ask governments not so much to ‘do
something’ as to ‘undo something’. Among the innovative suggestions
being made by economists for addressing environmental problems, fol-
lowing the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, is the removal of excessive
government subsidies to pollutive activities (World Bank, 1997a). This
action is attractive both because it benefits rather than retards the national
economy involved and because it can be done unilaterally rather than
requiring collective international action with attendant free-rider prob-
lems.
A classic example has to do with ‘greenhouse’ gases. The scientific com-
munity continues to debate the question as to whether the build-up of
carbon dioxide, ethane, and other greenhouse gases is contributing to a
significant warming of the earth’s surface; what the economic conse-
quences of global warming might be; and even whether the world as a
whole will be better or worse off. Yet, despite these gaps in our knowledge,
there seems to be a widespread presumption that governments must inter-
vene to ensure greenhouse gas emissions are reduced. For example, 150
countries gathered in Geneva in July 1996 to reach a United Nations con-
sensus on setting binding targets for reducing carbon emissions in stages
over the next 25 years. Given the uncertainty surrounding the likelihood
and possible consequences of global warming, it would seem prudent to
first search for ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions with policy
changes that can be justified on standard economic and local environ-
mental grounds. That is, to what extent are there unambiguous win–win
possibilities for reducing those emissions that would benefit the global
economy and the global environment? This paper explores one such set of
reforms that have recently begun to be implemented, namely reductions in
government distortions to the world’s coal markets, bearing in mind that
coal accounts for around 30 per cent of the world’s primary energy supply
and 40 per cent of carbon emissions from energy use (ignoring firewood).
Since both coal mining and coal burning are pollutive, it would be
optimal to tax the pollutive contributions of both production and con-
sumption of coal. Yet we observe several industrial countries subsidizing
coal mining, and many developing and former socialist countries subsi-
dizing coal burning, either explicitly and/or implicitly with the help of coal
trade barriers. To what extent is it possible that replacing those effective
production and consumption subsidies with optimal taxes—or even just
removing the subsidies and trade barriers—could simultaneously improve
the efficiency of resource use, reduce damage to local environments, and
lower greenhouse gas emissions? Earlier studies suggest there may well be
such possibilities (Burniaux, Martin and Oliveira-Martins, 1992; Hoeller
and Coppel, 1992; Larson and Shah, 1995), but they focus on all fossil fuels
rather than just on coal. It is of interest to examine the contribution of coal
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policies alone, since policies affecting the export supply of the other fossil
fuels are controlled largely by OPEC and, unlike coal policies, are not
under political pressure to change.
This paper addresses the issue in a series of steps. It first provides some
details of the environmental externalities on the demand and supply sides
of the coal market, from which it is then clear what the optimal policy
interventions would be for national governments if they ignore inter-
national pollution spillovers. These are then compared with the actual
policy interventions we observe in key national coal markets around the
world. The evidence on the extent of divergences between domestic and
international coal prices in various groups of countries shows that, as with
agriculture, coal producer and consumer prices have tended to be well
below border prices in developing and former socialist countries, and to be
well above border prices in several large industrial countries that are net
importers of coal. The possible consequences for economic activity and
greenhouse gas emissions of removing those subsidies—as has begun to
happen in the 1990s—are then explored. This is done first using a simple
theoretical partial equilibrium approach. Then some empirical results are
summarized from a recent study that uses a global computable general
equilibrium model known as G-Cubed. That model is able not only to
capture the effects exposed through partial equilibrium thinking but also
to take into account the possibilities for substitution in production and
consumption between products (including within the energy group) both
within and across countries when domestic relative prices are changed in
some or all regions. Notwithstanding the reforms of recent years, those
results suggest that significantly lower greenhouse gas emissions could
result from further reducing the remaining coal mining subsidies in the
OECD. Even larger benefits would result if poorer countries also raised
their artificially low domestic prices for coal. Some qualifications and the
environmental, trade, and policy implications of the analysis are discussed
in the final section of the paper.
2. Environmental externalities and optimal policy intervention in the
coal market
Traditionally, the externality most commonly thought of with respect to
coal was local air pollution in the form of smog generated from the
burning of coal by households and industry. That pollution is substantially
greater per unit of energy provided than that generated from other fuel
sources (except perhaps from firewood).1 More recently we have come to
appreciate the contribution also of sulphur dioxide emissions from coal
burning, especially in the form of acid rain. Those sulphur emissions—
which can vary considerably among coal sources—have down-wind
trans-border as well as intra-national effects that are undesirable. And
even more recently the additional worry has been coal’s contribution to
global greenhouse gases, most notably through carbon dioxide emissions:
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1 Apart from emitting far less visual pollution than coal, oil emits into the atmos-
phere only about two-thirds as much carbon per unit of energy as does coal, and
gas only about half as much (World Bank, 1997b, table 4.1).
40 per cent of the CO2 emitted globally from energy use came from coal in
the early 1990s (World Resources Institute, 1996). The distinguishing
feature of those emissions is that their contribution to global warming
occurs regardless of the location on the globe of the coal-burning activity.
Much less appreciated are the adverse environmental effects on the pro-
duction side, from coal mining. They include not just the visual eyesore of
holes in the ground in the case of open-cut mines or of mine overburden,
but also run-off and leaching from tailings and coal washeries can pollute
rivers and lakes. And of significance internationally are the contributions
to global warming from methane (CH4) from the mine, which increase
with mine depth. Coal mining contributed 13 per cent of global methane
emissions in the early 1990s (World Resources Institute, 1996). As it
happens, many of the mines in Europe are now extremely deep, and are
providing coal with relatively high sulphur content. Moreover, once pit
mines are exhausted, problems continue. During normal working of a
mine, water is pumped out virtually as soon as it enters, which prevents it
being contaminated by soluble minerals; but if that pumping is not con-
tinued after the mine closes, unpumped water gradually builds up and
eventually contaminates groundwater (Steenblik and Coroyannakis, 1995).
Government subsidies and protection from imports for such mines thus
add present and future production externalities to the more-commonly
understood local, regional, and global externalities on the consumption
side from coal burning.
These facts suggest the social marginal benefit curve in a national coal
market is below the private demand curve, and the social marginal cost
curve is above the private supply curve, and more so if the welfare of other
countries is also taken into account. Even ignoring the latter, the optimal
intervention in the presence of these externalities (assuming optimal inter-
ventions are in place in all other markets) involves taxing the undesired
pollution both from coal mining and from coal burning.2 Thus the removal
of any subsidies to coal mining or coal consumption, including indirect
subsidies via trade policies, are likely to be at least a partial step towards
the optimal measures and levels of government intervention in coal
markets.
3. Coal markets and current coal policies in various parts of the world3
The world’s coal production is remarkably concentrated. As of 1993 there
were just 13 countries whose production accounted for more than 1 per
cent of the world’s coal. They accounted for 91 per cent of global coal pro-
duction. They also accounted for 83 per cent of global coal consumption,
which suggests that countries which have coal use it but do not export it
much. In fact international trade accounts for only about one tenth of
global coal sales. (North America, Australia, and South Africa supply
three-quarters of that trade, with another 15 per cent coming from the
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2 In the past a case might have been made for some restriction of coal imports on
energy supply security grounds, but that is no longer valid now that coal is a
much smaller contributor to energy in coal-importing countries.
3 This and the next section draw on and extend analysis in Anderson (1992, 1995b).
former Soviet Union, China and Poland.) The trade propensity is low
partly because of the bulkiness of the product (high transport costs per
unit of energy), so that only the highest quality hard coal is worth trading.
But also to blame for the small share of production traded are the distor-
tionary subsidy and trade policies in both importing and exporting
countries, which happen to have a strong anti-trade bias.
Coal producer subsidies in Western Europe and Japan have been enor-
mous since the 1960s. On the other hand, the opposite policy bias has
prevailed in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union where policies
have kept coal prices below international levels, with perhaps even worse
economic and environmental consequences. Coal prices have been kept
artificially low in other developing countries too, most notably in the two
big coal-burning countries of China and India. In examining these distor-
tions, it is therefore helpful to separate the high-priced OECD countries
from the low-priced non-OECD countries.
OECD countries
Within the OECD, North American and Australasian coal markets are
reasonably free of coal market distortions. In Western Europe, by contrast,
costs of coal production per ton are as much as two to three times import
prices. These differences are maintained partly by restricting imports to
raise the domestic coal price, partly by the treasury subsidizing producers
directly, and partly by imposing minimum purchase obligations on elec-
tricity generating utilities, requiring them to buy certain volumes of coal
from local mines at above international prices. In Germany, for example,
the electricity utilities agreed to buy during 1992–1995 at least 87 per cent
of their coal needs from local mines, with only a quarter of that coal priced
at import parity and the rest at more than twice the import price—in return
for which the utilities have been allowed to pass on the high input cost to
electricity consumers, who also contribute an 8 per cent tax to help finance
the coal producer subsidy (Newbery, 1995).
The producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) of assistance to production of
hard coal, shown in table 1 as a percentage of the import price, reveals that
assistance to European Union and Japanese coal production has been very
large and grew rapidly during the 1980s. By the early 1990s it was equiv-
alent to providing a domestic producer price that was more than three
times the import price in Belgium and Germany, two times in Spain, and
40 per cent higher in France and the UK. There has in addition been con-
siderable assistance to coal producers that is not price related. In fact, over
the 1986–1992 period the assistance to production shown in table 1, as a
fraction of total assistance, was just two thirds for the UK, about half for
Germany and Spain, only a third for Belgium, and less than one tenth for
France (IEA, 1993, and earlier editions, and, for France, EC, 1992).
These estimated rates of assistance exceed those for agriculture in
Western Europe and Japan. As shown in the middle rows of table 1, in the
1990s the PSE is estimated to have averaged near 90 per cent of the border
price for EU agriculture, compared with more than 150 per cent for EU
coal. When expressed on a per worker basis, the difference in support has
been even larger. During 1987–1993, for example, the support in the EU for
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current production per full-time worker equivalent was $11,400 for
farmers (OECD, 1994),4 compared with two to four times that for coal
miners. Indeed total assistance per coal miner employed was close to
$90,000 for Belgium and Germany (nearly half of which was supporting
current production) and $38,000 for the UK in 1990 (see final three rows of
table 1). And, based on EC (1992) data, it was well over $100,000 for
France. According to these estimates—which were three times as large in
real terms as a decade earlier—it would have been far cheaper to close all
coal production in these countries (and Spain) and pay miners their
current wage to do nothing.
Estimates of the extent of consumer price distortion are more difficult to
determine, but the IEA (1994b) does provide user prices and import prices
for coal. Based on those data, it would appear that for Western Europe as a
whole both coking and steaming coal prices for users as compared with the
prices of imports from outside Western Europe have become steadily
greater. On average during 1984–1991, coking coal was priced to industry
about 15 per cent above the price of the most expensive imported US coal,
and steaming coal was about 40 per cent above for electricity utilities and
55 per cent above for industry users. Again this rivals the extent to which
food prices for consumers exceed border prices, which for the EU averaged
55 per cent during 1979–1993 (OECD, 1994). In addition, because coal
mined in the EU is ‘dirtier’ than its imported coal (Steenblik and
Coroyannakis, 1995, table 7), the utilities’ minimum local purchase obli-
gations require more to be spent on filters to burn the higher-priced
domestic coal.
An indication of the extent to which user prices in the most protective
European countries exceed those in the United States is given in table 2.
Steaming coal in the early 1990s was four times higher than the US price in
Germany, twice as high in the United Kingdom, and between 1.3 and 
2.3 times as high in Belgium and France. Not surprisingly, electricity 
prices were roughly double those of the US as well. Some of those differ-
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4 It had risen to $21,000 by 1995–1997 (OECD, 1998: 40).
Table 2. Steaming coal and electricity prices in Europe relative to the United States,
1990–1992 (US  100)
Coal price for Coal price for Electricity price for
industry electricity households
Belgium 133 143 212
France 234 130 191
Germany 459 377 205
United Kingdom 212 227 144
Hungary 250 197 55
Poland 81 55 33
Slovakia 72 58 32
Indiaa 90 39 na
Note: a 1990 only.
Source: IEA (1994b).
ences may reflect costs of transporting coal (and other energy raw
materials) to power plants, some is the result of different preferences for
preserving the environment, and some may reflect the greater need to tax
emissions in densely populated Europe; but much of it is the result of pro-
tective producer coal subsidies and associated barriers to coal import
competition.
During the 1990s, these subsidies have come under domestic political
pressure to be reduced. Belgium and the United Kingdom began the
process with actual cuts, and now France and Germany have made com-
mitments to gradually reduce government support to coal mining over the
next decade. For the United Kingdom at least, that has shown up as a fall
in the estimated coal PSE to 1996 (last column of table 1). The potential to
reform these policies is thus very real, making an examination of the effects
of such reform timely.
Non-OECD countries
Obtaining estimates of price distortions in Eastern Europe, the former
Soviet Union, and other transition and developing countries is more prob-
lematic. What is clear, though, is that in the past coal has been grossly
underpriced there, which helps explain the relatively high consumption
levels in some of those countries. Except in Hungary, the price of steaming
coal paid by electricity utilities in Eastern Europe has been only a fraction
(half or less) of the border price. Industry users paid somewhat more, but
they still received it at well below its opportunity cost on the world
market. The extent of underpricing is currently being reduced though,
with Hungary’s coal prices now matching the user prices in Western
Europe. Even so, it appears from the lower part of table 2 that electricity
users in the early 1990s were still hugely subsidised in Eastern Europe, as
in India, with prices between one third and one half those of the United
States. Thus the OECD’s GREEN model, calibrated to 1985, assumes that
coal prices average close to half border prices for each of Eastern Europe,
the former Soviet Union, China and India, which together account for all
but a sixth of the non-OECD coal market (Lee, Oliveira-Martins, and
Mensbrugghe, 1994). Table 3 shows that even up to the mid 1990s coal
prices in China were less than three-quarters of border prices, although the
higher ‘market’ as distinct from ‘plan’ prices there are applying to an
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Table 3. Domestic and border prices for coal, China, 1990–1995 (yuan per tonne)
Plan price Market price Bordera price Market-to-border price
1990 56b 150 225 0.67
1991 na 160 237 0.68
1992 na 147 248 0.59
1993 na 173 307 0.56
1994 na 189 285 0.66
1995 na 214 284 0.75
Notes: a Converted to yuan at market exchange rates.
b Unweighted average of ‘basic’ and ‘high’ plan prices.
Source: Anderson and Peng (1998).
increasing proportion (now more than half ) of sales as non-state owned
mines develop (Wang, 1996).5
What would be the implications of completely dismantling these 
coal subsidies and trade barriers? We begin using a simple theoretical
partial equilibrium approach and then turn to some empirical results that
draw on a global computable general equilibrium model known as 
G-Cubed.
4. Effects of dismantling coal subsidies: partial equilibrium analysis
Consider the coal market of a small open economy under the following
assumptions: coal is a homogeneous product; the domestic coal-mining
industry competes with imports that are freely available at a landed price
of Pw; there are negative production and consumption externalities associ-
ated with coal mining that are both intra- and inter-national/global such
that the private marginal cost curve for mining, Sp, is below the national
social marginal cost curve Ss, which in turn would be below the global
social marginal cost curve (not shown) if international pollution spillovers
were to be taken into account, and the private marginal benefit curve Dp is
above the national social marginal benefit curve Ds, which in turn would
be above the global social benefit curve (not shown) if international pol-
lution spillovers were to be taken into account; and the demand and
supply curves incorporate changes in productivity and any international
factor movements that would accompany domestic price changes. Under
these conditions, and assuming also that in related markets in the economy
there are no other distortions nor any externalities that are not offset with
optimal intervention measures, then this coal market can be depicted as in
figure 1.
Laissez faire versus optimal intervention
Equilibrium in figure 1 in the absence of any government intervention in
this coal market would involve a domestic price equal to Pw that would
induce OQ being produced and OC being consumed each year, with QC
imports satisfying the excess domestic demand at that price. These levels
differ from the optimal levels, however, given the presence of externalities
in this market. To simplify the analysis, assume transactions costs of taxing
environmental damage at the source (e.g., water contamination from
mining or sulphur emissions from burning coal) are sufficiently expensive
as to make coal production and consumption taxes the optimal interven-
tion instruments, and that this small nation ignores its contribution to
neighbouring countries’ and global pollution. Then on the production side,
OQ* is the optimal output level since it is where the national social mar-
ginal cost curve Ss intersects the import price line that represents the
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5 A rough preliminary set of estimates by the World Bank (1997b) suggests the rate
of underpricing of coal has halved in EEFSU and fallen by one-sixth in China and
India during the 1990s. Why coal, like food, should have been underpriced in
poorer countries and overpriced in coal-importing richer countries, and why
those policies are now beginning to be reformed, are important questions. Space
limitations preclude discussing them here, but see Anderson (1995a, b).
opportunity cost of producing domestically. That output level would be
attained if a tax on coal production were imposed which lowered the
domestic price received by miners from Pw to Pq*. And, on the demand
side, OC* is the optimal consumption level. At that level the curve repre-
senting the national social marginal benefit from coal burning, Ds,
intersects the import price line; it would be attained if a tax on coal con-
sumption were imposed which raised the domestic price paid for coal
from Pw to Pc*.
The welfare effects of imposing the tax on production can be shown in
areas in figure 1. That tax reduces coal producer welfare by aefg, raises gov-
ernment tax revenue by ahfg, boosts the welfare of those outside this
market who are harmed by coal mining activities by hmef, and thus
increases net economic welfare in this country by (aefg  ahfg  hmef )
hme. Welfare also is increased by imposing the optimal tax on coal con-
sumption. In that case coal consumer welfare is lowered by abcd,
government tax revenue is raised by ajcd, the welfare of those outside this
market but within the country who are harmed by local pollution from
coal burning activities is raised by bkjc, and thus net economic welfare in
this country is increased by (abcd  ajcd  bkjc ) bkj.
Effects of removing coal production subsidies
Now suppose this economy has in fact put in place a tax on coal con-
sumption that has raised the domestic price to Pc* and reduced coal use to
the optimal level of OC*; but instead of also putting in place a tax on
domestic production it has subsidised coal mining by offering a producer
price of Pq which has induced production to the level OQq and thus
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Figure 1. The effects of removing a subsidy to coal mining in a small open economy
lowered imports to QqC*.
6 Removing that inappropriate production
subsidy would lower production by QQq and producer welfare by aeru,
but it would also lower government outlays by atru and boost the welfare
of those outside this market who are harmed by coal mining activities by
emnr, hence net economic welfare would be greater by emnt.7 (If the gov-
ernment not only abolished the producer subsidy but also imposed the
optimal producer tax of PwPq*, there would be the additional net social
welfare gain of hme, or a total gain of hnt.) Thus both the economy and the
environment in this reforming economy would improve by removing that
coal production subsidy.
Should enough small open economies simultaneously remove their sub-
sidies to coal mining (and replace any associated coal import tariff with an
optimal consumption tax—see footnotes 2 and 3), import demand for and
hence the price of coal in the international market would rise. That would
reduce coal consumption globally and induce substitution towards using
other fuels, virtually all of which are less environmentally damaging and
in particular contribute less greenhouse gases than coal. Thus there would
be an environmental improvement not only in the reforming economies
(less local damage from coal mining and burning) but also in the world at
large (less greenhouse gas emissions of methane and carbon). Should
domestically mined coal in the reforming countries also be more sulphuric
than imported coal, the substitution by consumers away from domestic to
imported coal in these countries also would reduce acid rain at home and
in neighbouring down-wind countries.
Other countries that are net exporters of coal would benefit from the rise
in the international coal price, as would net exporters of substitute fuels to
a lesser extent, and conversely for net importers of energy. (This would
have second-round effects on aggregate demand including the demand for
coal, not shown in the diagram). But the world economy as a whole would
be better off, in addition there would be less local pollution in both the
reforming countries and other economies8 as well as less greenhouse gas
emissions (and even more so if those coal producer subsidies were
replaced by optimal producer taxes).
It is true that, if enough coal-importing economies removed their coal
production subsidies simultaneously, their loss from the adverse change in
their terms of trade may more than offset their gain from reducing their
Environment and Development Economics 467
6 The equivalent result would be achieved with an import tariff of Pc*Pw and an
additional production subsidy of PqPc*. In that case government direct outlays to
producers would have been smaller but there would have been no consumer tax
revenue, so the net impact on government revenue is the same.
7 If Pq  Pc*, then only an import tariff would have been necessary and the equiv-
alent reform would be a replacement of that tariff with an optimal consumption
tax of Pc*Pw.
8 The only possible exception is in those non-reforming countries where the extra
pollution from coal production expansion may more than offset the reduced pol-
lution from cuts in coal use. Globally the increase in pollution from such
production expansion is likely to be less than the reduction in pollution from coal
mining in reforming countries, however, since the latter tend to be among the
deepest in the world.
coal market distortion. Even so, that does not alter the fact that each small
reforming nation is better off economically and environmentally from so
reforming, for to abstain while others reformed would make them even
worse off because they would not have the domestic efficiency and
environmental gains to offset their deteriorating terms of trade.
Effects of removing coal consumer subsidies
Consider now another type of small open economy that is a net exporter of
coal, as depicted in figure 2. The notation and assumptions are otherwise as
for figure 1 and in particular both production and consumption externali-
ties are still present. In this case, however, the country is pricing coal below
rather than above the price at its border, Pw. Specifically, suppose the
country has taxed production so as to set the producer price optimally at
Pq* so that 0Q* is being mined per year; but instead of also taxing coal use
it has provided a consumption subsidy equal to PwPc so that 0Cc rather than
the optimal quantity of just 0C* is being consumed each year. Thus instead
of exports being C*Q* as under optimal national policies, they are just CcQ*.
Removing that inappropriate consumer subsidy would lower consumption
by CCc and consumer welfare by abvw, but it would also lower government
outlays by ayvw and boost the welfare of those domestic residents outside
this market who are harmed by the local pollution from coal burning by
bvzk, hence net economic welfare would be greater by byzk.9 (If the govern-
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9 As in the producer subsidy case, this consumer subsidy case could equally result
from a export tax of PwPq* plus an additional consumer subsidy of just Pq*Pc. If Pc 
Pq*, then only an export tax would have been necessary and the equivalent reform
would be a replacement of that export tax with an optimal production tax of Pq*Pw.
Figure 2. The effects of removing a subsidy to coal use in a small open economy
ment not only abolished the consumer subsidy but also imposed the
optimal consumer tax of Pc*Pw, there would be the additional net social
welfare gain of jbk, or a total gain of jyz.) Thus both the economy and the
environment in this reforming economy would improve. Should coal
burning in these countries also contribute to acid rain at home and in neigh-
bouring down-wind countries, the reduction in coal use would reduce that
environmental damage too.
Should enough small open economies simultaneously reduce their sub-
sidies to coal users (and replace any associated coal export tax with an
optimal production tax—see footnote 5), two offsetting effects on the
global environment would result. One is that coal consumption in these
reforming economies would fall, lowering global carbon emissions. The
other is that coal export supplies in the international market would rise,
causing the price of coal in that market to fall. That would encourage coal
consumption in the rest of the world. Thus it is an empirical question as to
whether there would be a net improvement or worsening of the global
environment from carbon emissions, even though there is an unequivocal
improvement in the local environment of these reforming countries.
Given their current low incomes, it is possible that some of these coun-
tries may place little or no negative value on their pollution from coal
mining. In that case their optimal producer price would be Pw and so
reform would also involve lifting the currently low prices received by
miners in those countries. That would add to production and to the
increase in net exports from these reforming economies, and hence to their
downward pressure on the international price of coal.
Other countries that are net importers of coal would benefit from the fall
in the international coal price, as would net importers of substitute fuels to
a lesser extent, and conversely for net energy exporters. (Again this would
have second-round effects on aggregate demand, including the demand
for coal, that are not shown in the diagram.) But the world economy as a
whole would be better off by the removal of coal consumer subsidies, so
long as the welfare gains in the reforming economies are not more than
offset by the welfare loss from any increase in greenhouse gas emissions,
should the latter occur.
If enough coal-exporting economies simultaneously removed their coal
consumer subsidies (and possible also their coal producer taxes), it is true
that their loss from the adverse change in their terms of trade may more
than offset their gain from removing their coal market distortions. Even so,
as with the case of producer subsidy reform in the coal-importing coun-
tries, that does not alter the fact that each small reforming nation is better
off economically and environmentally from so reforming, for if it
abstained while others reformed it would be even worse off because it
would not have the domestic efficiency and environmental gains to offset
its deteriorating terms of trade.
Reforming producer and consumer subsidies simultaneously
If both sets of countries were to remove their coal subsidies simul-
taneously, the coal trade expansion would be greater but the change in the
price of coal in the international market from producer subsidy cuts in rich
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countries would be more or less than offset by the change as a result of
removing the coal price distortions in poorer countries. Hence the sign of
the net price change, and of the changes in economic welfare in most coun-
tries, are empirical questions. The answers to those questions also depend
on the degrees of substitution in production and consumption as between
coal, other fuels, and other products, the net effects of which can only be
captured using a global multi-commodity model. In the next section we
describe an intertemporal multi-country global general equilibrium model
useful for that purpose, known as G-Cubed, discuss the simulation design
to be used, and then present some empirical results.
5. Effects of dismantling coal subsidies: empirical general equilibrium
analysis
The G-Cubed multi-country model of the world economy
The G-Cubed multi-country model has been constructed specifically to
contribute to the current policy debate on global warming, but it has many
features that make it useful for answering a range of issues in environ-
mental regulation and other economic policy questions. It is a global
model with substantial regional disaggregation and sectoral detail. In the
present version the world economy is divided into eight regions and the
model distinguishes five energy sectors (electric utilities, natural gas utili-
ties, petroleum processing, coal extraction, and crude oil and gas
extraction) and seven non-energy sectors (mining, agriculture, forestry
and wood products, durable manufacturing, non-durable manufacturing,
transportation, and services). A key feature of the model is that substitu-
tion possibilities in production and consumption are based on
econometrically estimated cost functions. Intertemporal budget con-
straints of households, governments, and nations (the latter through
accumulations of foreign debt) are imposed. To accommodate these con-
straints, forward-looking behaviour is incorporated in consumption and
investment decisions. Countries are linked not only by the flow of goods
and factors of production but also flows of financial assets with rates of
return based on returns in the real economy. The model has an internally
consistent macroeconomic framework in which saving and investment
decisions are determined endogenously. Overall, the model is designed to
provide a bridge between computable general equilibrium models and
macroeconomic models by integrating the more desirable features of both
approaches. In addition, it includes an environmental module which pro-
vides information on changes in carbon emissions as economic activities
change. Full details of the model are documented in McKibbin and
Wilcoxen (1995).
Simulation design
Using this model we assume the divergences between domestic and inter-
national coal prices in 1990 were as shown in table 4. That table also shows
the shares of each region in global coal production, consumption, and
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the importance of coal in primary
energy use in each region at that time. The model is then used to project
the world economy from 1990 to 2050 under the assumption of no change
470 Kym Anderson and Warwick J. McKibbin







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in coal or any other policies. Given this baseline scenario we then present
two scenarios as alternatives to a continuation of the policies of the early
1990s, both phased in over the period to 2005. One scenario involves coal
policy reforms just in OECD countries; the second scenario explores coal
policy reforms in non-OECD regions as well. In so far as some reform has
already taken place during the 1990s our results exaggerate the benefits
that remain to be reaped from continuing the process, but do not exag-
gerate the benefits of the overall reform.
Specifically, we analyse in the first case the effects of completely
removing the coal producer subsidies and import restrictions in Japan and
Western Europe, on the assumption that current consumer taxes there are
optimal from the viewpoint of society’s concerns with pollution from coal
in those densely populated countries.10 Removing coal producer subsidies
and import restrictions in the protective OECD economies would be
expected to lower their coal production and raise their coal imports,
causing coal prices in international markets to rise and stimulating substi-
tution away from coal use in all economies with open coal markets. In the
second scenario, we also raise domestic coal prices in non-OECD countries
up to international levels. This should have the effect of reducing coal con-
sumption in these countries, thereby lowering their carbon emissions in so
far as they use less fossil fuels in aggregate and they substitute towards
less carbon-intensive fuels than coal. But that reform also raises prices
received by coal producers in those non-OECD countries. This encourages
coal production and hence net exports of coal from these countries, which
would depress international coal prices and so encourage coal use and
hence greenhouse gas emissions elsewhere.11 The interesting empirical
question is whether the removal also of policies that depress domestic coal
prices in non-OECD countries adds to or offsets the positive environ-
mental effects of removing coal production subsidies and import
restrictions in Western Europe and Japan.
Empirical results: removing OECD production subsidies and import restrictions
The assumed policy decision to phase out production subsidies for coal in
Western Europe (denoted ROECD in the figures below) and Japan has the
effects expected within those regions, but some non-intuitive results
emerge for other regions. Figure 3 shows that global carbon dioxide emis-
sions fall over time as those production subsidies are gradually eliminated.
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10 In fact, according to Hoeller and Coppel (1992, chart 2), the coal consumption tax
per ton of carbon is far smaller in all OECD countries than the user taxes on oil
and gas, whereas if coal is more pollutive its use should be taxed more rather
than less than those other fuels. This suggests there is further scope for beneficial
reform beyond that considered in this paper.
11 We assume that by the beginning of the simulated reform the coal-mining enter-
prises in transition economies are operating as normal profit centres. In so far as
some state-owned mining enterprises are in fact still being propped up by gov-
ernment subsidies to cover operating losses and these are removed over the
simulated reform period to 2005, then we will have overstated the coal supply
response in these economies and thereby understated the contribution of reform
to reducing global carbon emission.
(This and subsequent figures present results as percentage deviations from
the baseline. Thus a value of zero indicates that the variable is equal to its
baseline value.) By 2005, global emissions are permanently reduced by
over 5 per cent per year forever. This fall in global emissions (relative to
what otherwise would happen) is almost entirely the result of a fall, of one-
eighth, in emissions from the OECD countries. Most of this decline occurs
in Western Europe, but emissions also decline in Japan and the United
States.
These changes can be understood by first recognizing that the removal
of OECD coal production subsidies leads to a rise in the price of coal in
international markets and hence in all regions where domestic prices
respond to change in international prices. That stimulates coal output in
and net exports from all other regions. The rise in the user price of coal also
leads to a substitution away from coal as an energy source and away from
producing carbon-intensive goods whose prices in international markets
also rise. Thus emissions fall in most OECD countries. The exception is
Australia where, as in the non-OECD regions, carbon emissions rise very
slightly. This is because those regions, as net exporters of coal, enjoy a
terms of trade gain and hence an income boost: although their coal prices
rise and the share of carbon-intensive energy falls relative to other energy
sources used (as occurs elsewhere in the world), the absolute amount of
carbon-based energy use nonetheless increases as a result of the effects of
higher incomes and foreign direct investment inflows in aggregate
demand in these economies.
In addition to these effects, a number of other factors are at work. In par-
ticular, the phasing out of coal production subsidies has a direct impact on
the fiscal positions of governments that have been paying the subsidies.
The saving in fiscal outlays is assumed to be used to reduce fiscal deficits
in those countries. In Western Europe especially this is a substantial saving
which, through macroeconomic adjustments, helps to offset the effect on
Environment and Development Economics 473
Figure 3. CO2 emissions
the economy of the adverse terms of trade change resulting from the rise
in the international price of coal. This beneficial fiscal effect is absent in
North America, Australasia, and the non-OECD regions where there are
assumed to be no policy changes; hence firms in these regions face higher
input costs for energy without any compensatory offset from greater
domestic saving lowering the cost of capital.
It should be stressed that the decline in carbon dioxide emissions from
fossil fuel use that is depicted in figure 3 is a decline relative to a baseline
in which global emissions are projected to rise from around 22 billion
tonnes in 1990 to around 32 billion tonnes by 2010 (IEA, 1994c), and hence
to almost 30 billion tonnes by 2005. Under this scenario they would still
rise, but only to about 28 billion tonnes by 2005.
The effects on national outputs and incomes are more diverse. Figure 4
contains results for real GDP, again as a deviation from baseline. GDP is
the value added by domestically located factors of production in each
economy. This is a measure of aggregate domestic production change; but
it does not take into account the international movements of capital
allowed for in the G-Cubed model. GNP, on the other hand, is a measure
of income to domestically owned factors of production no matter whether
they are located at home or abroad. Thus it is a better measure of economic
well-being of domestic residents than GDP since it measures their income
from all their owned factors of production.12 It does not include the nega-
tive valuation society places on greenhouse gas emissions though, and so
will understate the gains in well-being from policy changes that reduce
those emissions.
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12 Both GDP and GNP are measured in constant (1990) US dollars at the prices pre-
vailing in each scenario. Thus the difference between scenarios in estimated GDP
or GNP includes the effect of both quantity and price differences. Even GNP is
not an ideal measure of utility, however, but it is the best indicator of welfare that
is available in the model.
Figure 4. Gross domestic product (GDP)
In Western Europe (ROECD in the figures), the rise in energy import
prices and hence the prices to users leads to a fall in GDP during the
adjustment period as industries respond to higher input cost and the
economy adjusts to the deterioration in its terms of trade. By 2005, when
the coal production subsidies are completely removed, the gains from real-
locating resources within Western Europe begin to offset the negative
shock of higher energy import prices.13 By about 2020 those economies
have adjusted to the change in relative prices and GDP returns to close to
baseline. The recovery in its GDP is also the result of the permanently
higher level of saving by Western European governments as a result of the
fiscal savings from the reduction in subsidies. As in Japan, gains from an
improvement in economic efficiency and the government budget in
Europe outweigh the impact of slightly higher coal import prices and
hence user prices of coal within the domestic economy. Countries with a
relative abundance of coal experience a terms of trade improvement, by
contrast, and hence enjoy a rise in GDP (most notably Australia, China,
and the EEFSU region).
Bear in mind, though, that these GDP changes are not the same as
changes in GNP in particular regions. This is because the G-Cubed model
used here allows for foreign capital flows which adjust to changes in
market conditions, as is evident by comparing figures 4 and 5. Western
Europe, for example, exports financial capital to other regions under this
scenario so as to take advantage of the now higher earnings abroad than at
home. These higher earnings are reflected in GNP. Thus the reforms,
although leading to a lower level of GDP relative to baseline for Western
Europe, raise incomes there by 2014 because some of the capital released
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13 That negative shock is exaggerated in our modelling because we have not incor-
porated the fact that some electricity utilities in Western Europe are currently
forced to use more high-cost local coal than they would prefer at prevailing
prices (see section 3 above and Newbery, 1995).
Figure 5. Gross national product (GNP)
from the coal- and fossil-fuel intensive industries (or what would other-
wise have been invested in those industries) eventually earns a higher
return overseas than it would have if it had stayed in those industries as in
the baseline.
Overall, the effect of cutting coal production subsidies in the OECD is to
reduce significantly the emission of carbon dioxide, particularly in the
OECD. Even though this leads to some minor increase in carbon dioxide
emissions in relatively carbon-intensive developing countries as a result of
substitution away from the production of carbon-intensive goods in the
OECD, this ‘leakage’ effect is a negligible offset to the OECD’s carbon
emission reduction—in contrast to the leakage that would occur under an
international agreement in which only OECD countries voluntarily agreed
to curtail their carbon dioxide emissions while imposing no discipline on
non-OECD countries’ emissions. The reason to expect substantial leakage
in the latter case is because a voluntary cut-back in carbon emissions in the
OECD would cause a major reduction in OECD coal use and hence in the
international price of coal, thereby encouraging expanded use of coal in
non-OECD regions.14
Empirical results: effects of removing also coal consumer subsidies and export
taxes in non-OECD regions
Now consider the effect of adding to the phase-out of OECD production
subsidies (which began earlier this decade) a phase-out of coal market dis-
tortions in non-OECD economies (which are just beginning, most notably
in China and Central Europe). In this scenario we also completely remove
the subsidy to consumption of coal and the tax on coal production
(together with any associated export restriction) to bring coal prices to
international market levels in the non-OECD economies. The results for
the combined simulation are shown in figures 6 through 8.
As expected, the consequent rise in coal prices in the non-OECD
economies leads to an expansion of coal production and a contraction of
coal use within those economies. The expansion of production relative to
consumption implies an increase in net exports from non-OECD to OECD
economies, which on its own reduces the price of coal in international
markets and hence in these economies, offsetting slightly the rise resulting
from the OECD’s production subsidy cuts. The effects on total carbon
emissions, shown in figure 6, are the net effect of the removal of both
OECD and non-OECD coal market distortions compared with no reform.
In this case emissions from non-OECD countries also fall as their con-
sumption subsides are removed. By 2005 carbon dioxide emissions from
non-OECD economies are 4 per cent lower, when both OECD and non-
OECD policies are reformed together, than otherwise would have been the
case.
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14 How large that leakage would be depends on the nature of any international
agreement of course. Numerous attempts have been made to simulate various
possibilities. An early example is Piggott, Whalley, and Wigle (1992). See also
ABARE and DFAT (1995), McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1996), and the surveys in
Winters (1992) and IPCC (1996, ch. 11).
To understand the effect of the non-OECD policy reform alone, the first
set of simulation results should be subtracted from the combined results.
We showed in the simulation results for the OECD policy reform that
emissions from non-OECD economies rise slightly. Thus the effect of non-
OECD policies on reducing non-OECD emissions are slightly larger than
shown in figure 6. There is only a very slight rise in OECD emissions as a
result of the lower price of coal in international markets in this as com-
pared with the previous scenario, an effect that is dwarfed by the reduction
resulting from the OECD’s policy reform. Overall, global carbon dioxide
emissions fall by 8 per cent relative to what otherwise would have been
experienced by 2005, compared with just 5 per cent in the first scenario
involving only OECD reform. That is, despite the fact that reforms in the
non-OECD regions raise their net exports and hence lower the inter-
national price of coal, global carbon emissions are estimated to fall more,
evidently because the effect of eliminating coal consumption subsidies
turns out to dominate the effect of encouraging more coal mining in those
regions.
Not only do the transition and developing economies gain in terms of
emission reduction, but as well the changes in production contained in
figure 7 show that GDP rises in each of these regions. This is the result of
the efficiency gains from reducing their production and consumption dis-
tortions. Resources are freed up from the distorted sectors and reallocated
through the global economy, yielding higher rates of return. EEFSU output
expands substantially, while developing country output hardly alters in
this combined scenario as compared with the reduction in output shown
in figure 4, in which just the OECD countries reform.
Again the GNP effects are somewhat different from the GDP ones.
While the GNPs of the transition and developing economies are raised by
this combined reform, as compared with either no policy changes or just
OECD reform, Australia’s GNP is eventually lowered slightly when the
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Figure 6. CO2 emissions
non-OECD countries also reform. The latter is mainly because the terms of
trade of coal-exporting and capital-importing Australia gradually deterio-
rate as the non-OECD countries’ net exports of coal expand.
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined distortions in global coal markets that point to a
significant subsidization of coal production in OECD economies and sig-
nificant coal consumption subsidies in developing and transition
economies—when the opposite policies are what are needed to overcome
the environmental policies associated with coal mining and burning.
Model-based empirical evidence summarized here suggests that the
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Figure 7. Gross domestic product (GDP)
Figure 8. Gross national product (GNP)
gradual removal of production subsidies in the OECD and the removal of
distortions to coal markets in developing and transition economies can
potentially reduce global emissions of carbon dioxide by up to 8 per cent
relative to emissions that otherwise would have been experienced 
early next century. This environmental gain is achieved with gains in
economic efficiency rather than economic costs—a win–win outcome 
for the environment and the economy. Both gains would be even 
greater if Western European countries also raised their low coal consumer
tax rates as they phase out their coal producer subsidies, since those
consumer taxes are currently relatively low (see footnotes 10 and 13
above), presumably to lower the cost to electricity utilities of requiring
them to use lower-quality locally mined coal. And both gains would also
be enhanced if countries taxed domestic coal production optimally so as to
ensure coal mining enterprises compensate society for the pollution they
cause.
Thankfully the process of lowering coal subsidies and trade barriers has
already begun, with some EU economies (most notably Belgium and the
UK) already advanced in dismantling their coal production subsidies and
others (France and Germany) committing themselves to do so. And in
some transition economies the low prices of coal (and also oil and gas) are
gradually being raised. For example, in China many state-owned coal
mines are being transferred out of the hands of the state and gradually
subjected to domestic market forces. The results in this paper suggest these
reforms should be applauded as a positive contribution to the reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions, and countries should be encouraged to com-
plete the process.15
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